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TERMINATION OF THE COMMUNITY BY DEATH**
When a community regime terminates by reason of the death of a
spouse,' the difficulties encountered in dissolving the community multi-
ply. Problems in interpreting the matrimonial regimes legislation govern-
ing termination have been extensively explored elsewhere. 2 However, the
difficulties in reconciling the successions procedure and the matrimonial
regimes law have never been adequately considered.' During the three years
of deliberation before enactment of the matrimonial regimes law, even
the legislators were reluctant to consider the problem of termination of
the community by death. They simply expressed with assurance the opin-
ion that the articles on successions would apply if the community is dis-
solved by death.' Thus, "no scheme is provided delineating the applicability
of the various interrelated provisions.' '
The failure to adequately consider these problems, for which this
author must confess some responsibility,' was highlighted in the Loui-
siana First Circuit Court of Appeal opinion in Succession of Dunham.7
The executor of the husband's succession had petitioned to have two stock
certificates of a corporation reissued in his name. For purposes of the
pending rule only, it was conceded by the parties that the stock was com-
munity property. As the court observed, the surviving wife had previ-
ously filed petitions to partition the community and to be sent into posses-
sion of her share of the community.' The first circuit held that the stock
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** The author would like to express her appreciation to Professor Cynthia Samuel, Tulane
University School of Law and Professors P. Raymond Lamonica and H. Alston Johnson,
Louisiana State University Law School for time devoted to the discussion of this topic.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2356.
2. Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of
the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83 (1979); Note, Termination of the
Community, 42 LA. L. REV. 789 (1982).
3. "Even more comprehensive study is necessary concerning the interrelationship of
articles 2357 and 2357.1 and the articles governing the administration of successions." Spaht
& Samuel, supra note 2, at 141.
4. Id. at 141 n.354.
5. Id. at 141.
6. Id. Member of Advisory Committee to Joint Legislative Subcommittee Revising
Louisiana's Community Property Laws.
7. 428 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); see also Succession of Pyle, 434 So.
2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (widow petitioned for possession of her undivided one
half of the community, and the issue was whether the succession was relatively free from
debt under articles 3001-3002 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure).
8. It should be noted that Mrs. Dunham has previously filed petitions to parti-
tion the community and to be sent into possession of her share of the community.
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should be reissued in the executor's name, to be voted by him without
the surviving spouse's concurrence.
The surviving spouse had argued that upon the death of a spouse
the other spouse and the heirs of the deceased become coowners of the
community property.' In distinguishing termination of the community by
divorce from termination by death, the court observed that de jure posses-
sion of one half of the community at death requires "recognition" by
judicial action.' ° The judicial action required is the judgment of posses-
sion. For this proposition the court cited Succession of Sharp," Succes-
sion of Caffarel,'" and article 3032 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure.' 3 According to the court, the holding of the two decisions was
"that the succession representatives, rather than the surviving spouse in
community, enjoy de jure possession of the surviving spouse's one-half
community, although the surviving spouse in community may be sent in-
to possession during administration if the succession is relatively free from
debt and (an additional requirement found solely in Sharp) the business
affairs of the succession are not complex."'" Likewise, according to the
court, the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure entitles the succession
representative, rather than the surviving spouse, to possession of the sur-
vivor's one half of the community until the spouse obtains a judgment
of possession.
Both Succession of Sharp and Succession of Caffarel were decided
before the amendments to the matrimonial regimes articles. In both cases,
an administration of the succession had been initiated, and the surviving
spouse sought to terminate the administration and to be placed in posses-
sion of her half of the community property. It is of importance that in
both instances, as in Succession of Dunham, the surviving spouse was
the wife.' 5 In Sharp, the principal issue was whether the surviving spouse's
However, counsel for Mrs. Dunham and other counsel agree that the sole
issue before this court is the narrow issue taken up on the rule decided below
of whether or not Dr. Endsley is legally entitled to have Certificates Nos. 8 and
9 reissued in his name as dative executor.
428 So. 2d at 878.
9. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2336, 2356.
10. 428 So. 2d at 879. "Dhuet v. Taylor considers dissolution of the community by
divorce, and hence does not apply to dissolution of the community by death." Id.
11. 288 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 911 (La. 1974).
12. 378 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 509 (La. 1980).
13. Article 3032 provides in part: "The petition of the surviving spouse in community
for possession under Article 3031 shall comply with all of the pertinent provisions of Arti-
cle 3002."
14. 428 So. 2d at 879.
15. For a discussion of the historical right of administrator of husband's succession
to administer wife's one-half interest in the community and the effect of article 3001 of
the Code of Civil Procedure in permitting the administrator of the wife's succession to
administer the husband's one half interest, see Comment, The Fictitious Community and
the Right to Partition, 30 LA. L. REv. 603, 620 (1970).
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share of the community should bear any portion of the attorney's fee
and executor's fee. According to the fourth circuit, the general rule is
that "the expense of administering a community estate is borne equally
by the decedent's share and the surviving spouse's share." 6 The reason
for assessing a proportionate part of the fees to the survivor was that
the "usual purpose of an administration . . . is to determine and liquidate
the obligations of the community in order to determine the net assets
and to distribute them equally between the surviving spouse and the heirs
and/or legatees of the decedent." 7 However, the administration of the
community is necessary only where the succession is not relatively free
from debt or where the business affairs involved are complex. If, as in
Sharp, the administration is undertaken solely to determine the estate tax
liability of the decedent's share (presumably for the principal benefit of
his heirs or legatees), the expenses of administration are not chargeable
to the surviving spouse's share of the community.
In Succession of Caffarel the specific issue was whether the surviving
spouse in community could petition and be placed in possession of her
one half of the community even though an administration had begun.
The fourth circuit concluded that the surviving spouse had the right dur-
ing the administration, under article 3362 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
to petition for possession of her one half of the community. 8 The court
interpreted the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure as permitting the
surviving spouse to terminate the administration just as an heir could if
the spouse accepted the community and the succession was relatively free
of debt. To deny her this right would force "an unnecessary administra-
tion upon a surviving spouse in community merely because one of the
competent heirs desires one (perhaps to collect administrator's fees)." 9
The decisions in both Sharp and Caffarel were based upon the legal
assumption that authority existed in the succession representative of the
husband to administer the surviving wife's one half interest in the com-
munity. The assumption was well founded in the jurisprudence;2" it was
16. 288 So. 2d at 415 (emphasis added).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 3362:
At any time prior to the homologation of the final tableau of distribution,
the heirs of an intestate whose succession is under administration may be sent
into possession of all or part of the property of the succession upon filing a peti-
tion of possession as provided in Articles 3001 through 3008, except that the pro-
ceeding shall be contradictory with the administrator. Upon the filing of such
a petition, the court shall order the administrator to show cause why the heirs
should not be sent into possession. If the heirs are sent into possession of a part
of the property, the administrator shall continue to administer the remainder.
19. Succession of Caffarel, 378 So. 2d at 203.
20. See Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890) (first case recogniz-
ing the existence of a "fictitious community" at termination for the purpose of paying
creditors of community obligations); see also Comment, supra note 15, at 604, and authorities
1983]
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based upon the nature of the wife's interest in the community and the
husband's authority as head and master of the community during its
existence. 2' Furthermore, implicit in this assumption was the idea that the
power of the representative of the deceased husband to administer the
interest of wife existed, even if she accepted the community, if the suc-
cession was not relatively free from debt or the business affairs of the
community were complex. Presumably, such a position could be justified
under the substantive law because the husband as head and master was
the only spouse with power to contract community debts, and he remained
responsible despite the wife's incurring personal liability for one half by
her acceptance. The articles of the Code of Civil Procedure were consis-
tent with such a conclusion.2"
It was in this context that the facts of Succession of Dunham arose.
Mr. Dunham died on April 17, 1974; therefore, the statutory law and
jurisprudence in effect prior to January 1, 1980 applied. Furthermore,
the rights accorded a spouse upon termination of the community, including
the right of the wife to renounce,23 are substantive, so the new statutory
scheme could not have been constitutionally applied in Dunham.24 Never-
theless, without limiting its decision to the application of the law in ef-
fect prior to January 1, 1980, the court opined:
It should be noted that the amending of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3032
by La. Act No. 711 of 1979, effective January 1, 1980, subse-
quent to the decision in T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery,
legislatively sets aside any possible argument that a form of
recognition of ownership by the surviving spouse requiring less
judicial action than a judgment of possession is sufficient to give
the surviving spouse possession de jure, of his or her undivided
one-half of the community, as the amendment clearly provides
that the surviving spouse in community is to petition for
possession."
cited therein; Neal v. Lapleine, 48 La. Ann. 424, 19 So. 261 (1896); Newman v. Cooper,
46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894); Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 901, 154 So. 2d 769 (1963).
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 6); Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973) (described the wife's
ownership of one half of the community property as imperfect), and authorities cited therein.
But see LA. CIV. CODE art. 2398 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627 § 6), and comments thereto.
22. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3004, 3362; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3001 (as it appeared
prior to its amendment by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 3); Comment, supra note 15, at 619-22.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2410 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 6); Wattigny v. Wattigny, 402 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
24. See Wanigny v. Wattigny, 402 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); see generally
Samuel, The Retroactivity Provisions of Louisiana's Equal Management Law: Interpreta-
tion and Constitutionality, 39 LA. L. REV. 347 (1979).
25. 428 So. 2d at 879.
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Article 3032 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides
that the petition of the surviving spouse for possession of her interest
in the community shall allege the facts that show she is the surviving spouse
in community.26 The amendment eliminated the requirement of proof of
the widow's acceptance of the community27 because under the substantive
law her acceptance is no longer required for her to claim one half of
the assets.28 By virtue of the amendment and reenactment of article 3032
(otherwise virtually unchanged), the court concluded that the legislature
intended no change in the former procedure. This conclusion is reached
despite the fact that it is no longer supported by the substantive law:
The wife has a present, vested one-half interest in the community
property,29 equal management powers,30 and an equal opportunity to in-
cur obligations capable of satisfaction from community assets. 3'
The author suggests that the amendment of article 3032 should not
be interpreted as necessarily reflecting a legislative intent that the pro-
cedure remain the same. 2 The amendment of article 3032 was contained
in Act 711 of 1979, companion legislation to the matrimonial regimes law.
The purpose of the amendments contained in Act 711 was to remove
references to the old law, 33 but insufficient attention was given to im-
plementation of the new law. Under matrimonial regimes law, upon ter-
mination of the community for any cause,3" the spouses or their heirs
become coowners of the community property with the right to seek a
partition.33 The creditors of the spouses have certain defined rights for
obtaining satisfaction of their pretermination obligations.3 6
26. Amended article 3032 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quoted in part, supra note 13.
27. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 3.
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336; see also authorities cited supra note 20; cf. LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 2398, 2409 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627,
§ 6); Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2346; see also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2347-2352; cf. LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 2334, 2404 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 6).
31. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2345.
32. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 2.
33. Ultimately, the legislature enacted three of the original five bills: (1) Act 709,
consisting of almost all of the revised articles on matrimonial regimes; (2) Act
710, concerning the marital portion; and (3) Act 711, containing amendments to
the Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and Revised Statutes coordinating other
related provisions of law with the changes in matrimonial regimes law accomplished
in Act 709. Companion bills establishing the procedure for an administration of
community property upon termination of the regime . . . were not enacted.
Id. at 84.
34. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2356-2357. Article 2357 does not distinguish between the causes
of termination as the court does in Succession of Dunham when examining the jurisprudence.
See quote supra note 10.
35. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1983).
36. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2357.
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Upon examination of the substantive law, a question arises as to
whether it affords any basis for treating the heirs of the husband dif-
ferently from the husband himself, or, considering the position of the
surviving spouse, for treating her differently when she is seeking relief
against her husband's heirs rather than her husband.37 The property she
is claiming is owned, not inherited, by her. Under the 1982 legislation
governing the judicial partition of community property, courts have
authority to allocate the assets and liabilities between the spouses so that
each receives property of equal net value.38 Is harm done to either the
heirs or the creditors by allowing the surviving spouse to obtain a parti-
tion of community property, and the share allocated to the deceased then
being administered? Although a mechanism exists for partitioning a
succession, 9 what it contemplates is a partition among the coheirs. ° It
does not contemplate a division of community property between spouses,
but a partition of the deceased's property among the heirs. Furthermore,
its utility is further impaired by the condition that once the succession
has been judicially opened, as in Dunham, the coheirs cannot petition
for a partition "unless they could at that time be sent into possession.""'
If a partition of community property precedes an administration of
the deceased spouse's succession, one possible harm the heirs might suf-
fer is that the allocation of debts in the partition proceeding does not
affect the rights of creditors."' Pretermination creditors may continue to
seize the assets of the former community allocated to the succession, unless
prevented by the articles on the administration of successions. 3 Further-
more, the spouse (and perhaps his heirs)" who disposes of former com-
37. Nothing in the matrimonial regimes legislation draws such a distinction. See LA.
CIv. CODE arts. 2356-2357.
38. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1983).
39. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3461-3462; see LA. CODE CIV. P. art 3461, comments (a), (b).
40. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1289-1414.
41. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3462: "When a succession has been opened judicially, the
coheirs and legatees of the deceased cannot petition for a partition of the succession prop-
erty unless they could at that time be sent into possession of the succession under Articles
3001, 3004, 3006, 3061, 3361, 3362, 3371, 3372, or 3381."
42. LA. R.S. 9:2801(4)(c) provides in part: "As between the spouses, the allocation
of a liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. The allocation
in no way affects the rights of creditors."
43. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3081-3395.
44. The issue of heritability of the "potential liability" of Civil Code article 2357 must
be decided under the provisions of Civil Code articles 1997-2009. The responsibility attaching
to a spouse who disposes of former community assets other than for the satisfaction of
community obligations is a "potential liability." The obligations contemplated as heritable
under articles 1997-2009 are perfect obligations, rather than "potential" ones. However,
the presumption of heritability of obligations contained in article 1999 combined with the
purpose of article 2357 probably will result in the imposition of this potential liability upon
the heirs of a spouse.
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munity assets other than for the satisfaction of community obligations
incurs personal liability to the creditors of the other spouse to the extent
of the value of the property so disposed.
4 5
Heirs who accept the succession unconditionally," with or without
an administration,47 are aware that they are assuming all of the respon-
sibilities of the deceased. However, an heir may not realize that part of
the responsibility he may assume is the "potential" liability to creditors
of the surviving spouse by the disposition of assets of the former
community."1 If assets of the former community remain to be distributed
to an heir and if he disposes of such assets, he assumes personal liability
to the creditors of the survivor to the extent of the value of the property
alienated. In comparison to other existing liabilities the heir assumes by
his acceptance, his responsibility to the creditors of the surviving spouse
is not limited to his proportionate part of the debt.4' He is liable for
the whole of the debt, limited by the value of the property alienated."0
The distinction in ultimate responsibility may be supported by the fact
that it is his action, i.e., disposal of property of the former community,
which creates the "perfect" obligation.
45. LA. CrV. CODE art. 2357. The rights against assets accorded to the creditors of
the survivor are somewhat analogous to the privilege of creditors of the deceased on succes-
sion property. The privilege to effect a separation of patrimony, however, is distinguishable
in the following respects: (1) it exists for three months after the death as to movables;
(2) it results in the creditors of the deceased being paid in preference to the creditors of
the heir; and (3) as to immovable property, it may be recorded within three months of
the death of the deceased and be enforced against the immovable property alienated within
three months of the death of the deceased. LA. R.S. 9:5011-:5016 (1983).
46. Civil Code article 1013 provides in part:
The effect of the simple acceptance of the succession, whether express or tacit,
is such, that when made by an heir of age, it binds him to the payment of all
debts of the succession, not only out of the effects which have fallen to him
from the succession, but even personally, and out of his own property, as if he
had himself contracted the debts or as if he was the deceased himself; unless,
before acting as heir, he makes a true and faithful inventory of the effects of
the succession, as here above established, or has taken the benefit treated of
hereafter.
47. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3081-3395 (with administration); LA. CODE CIV. P. arts.
3001-3035 (without administration).
48. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2357.
49. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1371:
No partition is made of the passive debts of the succession; each heir remains
bound for the part he takes in the succession, but in order to equalize the shares,
those heirs who take the largest allotments may be charged with the payment
of a larger portion of the debts.
50. Civil Code article 2357 provides in part: "If a spouse disposes of property of the
former community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of community obligations, he
is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value of that community
property."
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The heir who accepts with benefit of inventory assumes the liabilities
("potential liabilities") of the deceased to the extent of the property
inherited."1 Arguably, the beneficiary heir who disposes of the former com-
munity's assets which are distributed after the administration is liable out
of the succession assets that remain in his possession.5 2 Although not a
creditor of the deceased, the creditor of the surviving spouse was a "poten-
tial creditor" whose right accrued by action of the heir. The heir's respon-
sibility is limited53 by virtue of his acceptance with benefit of inventory
to "abandoning all the effects of the succession.""' Such an interpreta-
tion accomplishes the purpose of the matrimonial regimes legislation,"
yet protects the heir who accepts with benefit of inventory from personal
responsibility. 6
Of course, the potential adverse consequences to the heirs of the
deceased described above would exist whether or not the partition preceded
the administration. Even if the entire community were administered by
the executor of the deceased, the same consequences would follow, as
explained below.
Are the rights of creditors adversely affected by permitting the sur-
viving spouse to obtain a partition of the community before the administra-
tion of the deceased's succession? Under matrimonial regimes law, nothing
prevents the pretermination creditors of either spouse from seizing former
community assets in satisfaction of their debts. 7 Furthermore, the alloca-
tion of debts in the partition proceeding does not affect the rights of
creditors. 8 If the entire community must be administered, the Code of
Civil Procedure prohibits the creditors of the deceased husband from seiz-
ing community assets. Literally, the creditors of the surviving spouse are
not prohibited from seizing former community assets in satisfaction of
their debts. 9
51. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1054, 1058.
52. By this time, the "former community" assets would be those allocated to the deceased
by the partition under LA. R.S. 9:2801 that remain after an administration of the deceased's
succession (which also include his separate property). LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3361, 3371.
This is assuming that orders by the judge requiring the sale of community assets are not
dispositions as contemplated in the second paragraph of Civil Code article 2357. See Spaht
& Samuel, supra note 2, at 140; Note, supra note 2.
53. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1054, 1058.
54. Civil Code article 1054 provides in part: "The effect of the benefit of inventory
is that it gives the heir the advantage: 1. Of being discharged from the debts of the succes-
sion by abandoning all the effects of the succession to the creditors and legatees ... .
55. "[1]t is necessary to resort to the purpose underlying the second paragraph [of
Civil Code article 2357], which is to maintain for the benefit of unpaid pre-dissolution creditors
the property of the former community, or its value, for the satisfaction of their debts."
Spaht & Samuel, supra note 2, at 126.
56. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1054, 1058.
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357.
58. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1983).
59. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3247: "Execution shall not issue against any property of
[Vol. 44
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The argument that the spirit of article 3032 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure would prohibit the seizure by the creditors of the surviving spouse
is not persuasive since her creditors are denied participation in the pay-
ment scheme of administration.6 0 The articles prohibiting execution and
providing for acknowledgment and payment of claims are correlative:
"These articles are designed to withdraw the succession from ordinary
execution by creditors and to subject it only to the orderly process of
administration." 6 ' Thus, the matrimonial regimes legislation, creating a
right in community property in favor of the creditors of someone other
than the deceased, effectively defeats the purpose sought to be achieved
by the administration articles. Before the new matrimonial regimes legisla-
tion became effective, the creditors of the wife had no claim against com-
munity property since theoretically only the husband's creditors could seize
community property in satisfaction of their debts.
Even if the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure, resorting to their
"spirit,"6 2 could be read as encompassing the creditors of the surviving
spouse, why should her property be subjected to an "unnecessary" ad-
ministration? The administration of the entire community is unnecessary
because the partition legislation provides for as orderly a process as ad-
ministration for terminating the community, while recognizing the im-
mediate right of the surviving spouse to her interest in the community
property.
The more specific issue that the litigation in Dunham raises concerns
the community stock certificates and the power to vote the stock. At ter-
mination of the community, the power to manage community property
under the matrimonial regimes legislation terminates. 63 The corporations
law authorizes a corporation to transfer stock upon its books to the ex-
ecutor or to the heirs or legatees of the deceased." But this authority
is discretionary," and other provisions of the law state that an "order
a succession under administration to enforce a judgment against the succession represen-
tative, or one rendered against the deceased prior to his death." (Emphasis added). Cf.
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3248: "The provisions of Articles 3246 and 3247 shall not prevent
the enforcement of a conventional mortgage on or a pledge of movable or immovable prop-
erty of the succession in a separate proceeding."
60. Article 3241 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part: "A creditor of a
succession under administration may submit his claim to the succession representative for
acknowledgment and payment in due course of administration." (Emphasis added).
61. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3247, comment (a).
62. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 3247, comment (a).
63. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2356. The spouses become coowners of community property
at termination. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336. See also Lane v. Lane, 375 So. 2d 660, 680
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writs denied, 381 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1980) ("The husband argues
that, once the judgment of divorce dissolved the marriage, the community no longer existed
and therefore it became impossible for either husband or wife thereafter to contract a debt
for the 'community'. . . . We agree.").
64. LA. R.S. 12:603(A) (1969).
65. LA. R.S. 12:603(A) (1969).
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of any court of competent jurisdiction ordering the transfer of shares to
an executor or the judgment of any court . . .recognizing and putting
such heirs or legatees in possession ... shall be full and sufficient authority
for the making of said transfer."", Should the corporation exercise the
discretionary power it is given wrongfully, it will be liable for damages; 7
hence, the reason for the executor's rule in Dunham.
One alternative to the court's decision authorizing reissuance of the
stock in the executor's name might be to permit the executor and the
wife each to vote half the shares. Another alternative would be to apply
the management rules applicable during the existence of the community.68
Either of these alternatives could be expeditiously accomplished in the
partition proceedings. Because the partition procedure permits an initial
determination of the classification of the stock by summary proceeding,
the partition articles are peculiarly adapted to respond to a request for
immediate action. 9 Whichever alternative the court selected could terminate
with the judgment partitioning the property.
In the future, some greater accommodation must be made to the rights
of the surviving spouse at termination of the community by death. It would
be helpful if the legislature could address specifically the problem of how
to balance the interests of the survivor with those of the heirs of the de-
ceased. Some direction in the resolution of the policy considerations is
desperately needed.
66. LA. R.S. 12:603(C) (1969).
67. A corporation, the capital stock of which is transferable only upon its books,
is the custodian of the shares therein, and, being vested with the power and charged
with the duty to protect the interests of the owners of such shares, it must repair
any injury which they may sustain by reason of its failure properly to exercise
such power and discharge such duties; and, where it permits shares to be transferred,
without the authority of the owner, it may be compelled to replace them, if there
are other shares within its control, or, if there be no other shares within its con-
trol, it must respond in damages.
Leurey v. Bank of Baton Rouge, 131 La. 30, 38, 58 So. 1022, 1025 (1912).
68. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2346, 2347, 2351.
69. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1983).
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